Did King Ajātasattu Confess to the Buddha, and did the Buddha Forgive Him?
2008
Is it possible to counteract the consequences of a moral transgression by publicly acknowledging it? When he reveals to the Buddha that he has killed his father, King Ajātasattu is said to “yathādhammaṃ paṭikaroti.” This has been interpreted as “making amends,” or as seeking (and receiving) “forgiveness” for his crime. Successfully translating this phrase into English requires that we reexamine etymology and dictionary definitions, question assumptions made by previous translators, and study the way that yathādhammaṃ paṭikaroti is used in context. We can better understand confession as a practice by locating it within the general Indian concern for ritual purity—ethicized by the Buddha—and showing that the early Buddhist doctrine of kamma allows for mitigation, though not eradication, of the consequences of actions under some circumstances.
The Hundred Syllable Vajrasattva Mantra.
2010
A review of the text of the mantra reveals that simple changes result in grammatical Sanskrit phrases. The essays discusses how errors might have crept into the mantra resulting in a garbling of the text.
Possible Iranian Origins for Sākyas and Aspects of Buddhism.
2012
In 2010 Harvard Indologist Michael Witzel commented, on the Indo-Eurasian_Research online forum, that we should treat the Śākyas as an early incursion of Scythians (known in Sanskrit as Śaka, and in Iranian as Saka) who brought with them many ideas related to Iranian culture and/or Zoroastrian religion. This article explores the evidence for Witzel's suggestion and finds that it is not implausible. If true this would allow us give Buddhism a (pre-)history of ideas, whereas Buddhists treat Buddhism as historically unique and ahistorical.
Facing Death without a Soul: A Response to George Adams
2012
After offering a critique of Adams's presentation of Buddhism as nihilistic, this essay addresses the question of why we believe we can survive the death of our body. Thomas Metzinger’s representationalist theory of consciousness, drawing on the objectivity of neuroscience is clearly consonant with non-essentialist views of the self, implying that belief in an eternal soul is objectively false. However I conclude by arguing that in any interfaith dialogue focussing on competing doctrines is less productive than empathising with common values.
Translation Strategies for the Cūḷa-Māluṅkya Sutta and its Chinese Counterparts
2013
Translations of the Cūḷa-Māluṅkya Sutta provide some interesting comparisons of strategies used by contemporary English translations and 4th-century Chinese translators, particularly with respect to rare and unusual words.
Escaping the Inescapable: Changes in Buddhist Karma: Changes in Buddhist Karma
2014
Early Buddhist karma is an impersonal moral force that impartially and inevitably causes the consequences of actions to be visited upon the actor, especially determining their afterlife destination. The story of King Ajātasattu in the Pāli Samaññaphala Sutta, where not even the Buddha can intervene to save him, epitomizes the criterion of inescapability. Zoroastrian ethical thought runs along similar lines and may have influenced the early development of Buddhism. However, in the Mahāyāna version of the Samaññaphala Sutta, the simple act of meeting the Buddha reduces or eliminates the consequences of the King’s patricide. In other Mahāyāna texts, the results of actions are routinely avoidable through the performance of religious practices. Ultimately, Buddhists seem to abandon the idea of the inescapability of the results of actions.
Heart Murmurs: Some Problems with Conze’s Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya: Some Problems with Conze’s Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya
2015
In his critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the Prajñāpāramitāhrdaya, first published in 1948, Edward Conze treated the verb vyavalokayati as intransitive and declined pañcaskandha as nominative plural, making the first sentence in the text difficult to parse. A comparison of some of the extant manuscripts, the canonical versions in Chinese and Tibetan, the Tibetan manuscripts found at Dūnhuáng, and the Indian commentaries preserved in Tibetan shows that they all understand vyavalokayati to be transitive and thus requiring an object. They also show that the most obvious object for vyavalokayati is pañcaskandha. I show that a simple amendment to the critical edition solves these and two other minor problems with the Sanskrit text. Conze’s own translation not only reflects the grammatical problems of his Sanskrit edition, but may give us insights into the reasoning behind his Sanskrit text by highlighting the role his religious faith played in his reading of the text.
